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a  b  s  t  r a  c t
This  paper examines  the  relations between  financing  institutions  and  more local  ownership structures
for  energy provision.  This  research  defines  municipal  and civil  society  structures  involved in  energy
provision  as  the  ‘Civic  Energy  Sector’.  It  argues  that the  financial institutions  of nations are  key  enabling
institutions  for  this  sector  to contribute to a  low  carbon  energy  transition.  The path of development  of
these  financial institutions helps  to shape the  ownership structures  and  technology choices  of energy
systems  and futures in different nations. This  paper presents  findings  from  case analysis  comparing  the
United Kingdom’s  latent civic energy  sector,  with  the  expansion  of this  sector in Germany.  Using  an
institutional economics  framing,  the  paper demonstrates  the  importance  of the  German  local banking
sector in facilitating civic ownership structures  in that  country. In  contrast, the  neo-liberal,  market-led
financial institutions  in the  UK, reinforce  energy  pathways less reliant  on civic ownership  models. Hence,
the  forms  of low  carbon  energy transition  being pursued  in these  countries  are constrained  by  path
dependence  of institutions  both  within  and  beyond  the  energy sector.
© 2015  The Authors.  Published by  Elsevier  Ltd. This is an open  access article  under  the  CC  BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
This paper explores the concept of a  ‘civic’ energy sector, com-
prising citizen, community, co-operative and municipal ownership
of energy systems. The authors argue this is  a  useful classification
for examining the role  of institutions beyond the market and state
in energy transitions. The authors explore the relations between
these civic ownership structures and institutions of banking and
finance, arguing that the macro financial institutions of nations are
key enablers in energy transitions. It  is increasingly important to
understand how financial institutions can enable civic energy par-
ticipation, and how these interact with regulatory institutions, such
as feed in tariff laws or  portfolio standards, to  constrain or  incen-
tivise different ownership forms. As such it is useful to conceive
of a ‘civic energy sector’ as consisting of both ‘community’ energy
schemes and municipal business models in  generation, distribu-
tion, supply, and examine their enabling financial institutions.
Previous research has examined the effects of different gov-
ernance and institutional framings on national energy system
transitions [1,12].  However, as these system transitions are largely
country-specific, this paper adopts a comparative case study of the
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E-mail address: stevehallrise@gmail.com (S. Hall).
emerging civic energy sectors in the UK, and Germany. Understand-
ing the enabling role of financial institutions has wider significance
for assessing the potential for civic energy sectors in  other nations
to  play a  substantive role in achieving transitions to secure, afford-
able and low carbon energy systems.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 establishes the
concept of a  civic energy sector and highlights a  gap in  the litera-
ture on the role of institutions of finance in energy systems change.
Section 3 describes the comparative case methodology. Section 4
presents empirical results on  the participation of civic forms in  the
UK and Germany, and the effect of financial institutions on the
deployment of renewable energies. Section 5 discusses how the
contrasting emergence of a  civic energy sector in  these two  coun-
tries has been shaped by their respective financial institutions and
linked social and cultural values. Section 6 concludes the analysis
and proposes further research questions.
2.  The concept of a civic energy sector and the role of
financial institutions
2.1. Community and municipal energy
Much work exploring civil society participation in the energy
sector has focussed on community-led energy projects. These treat-
ments often analyse the internal dynamics of organisations as
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2015.11.004
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opposed to taking a systemic perspective. Research has tended to
focus on community generation [2–4] or investigate group forma-
tion, policy suitability and barriers to entry [5–8]. In parallel to the
community energy debate, there is  a  growing understanding that
the municipal level can be a key actor in  energy transitions [9–11],
particularly in a decentralised future [12,13].  However, research
into municipal institutions in the energy sector has also tended
towards analysis of their internal workings; or  the alignment of
‘institutions, techniques and artefacts’ that bring urban actors into
the energy space [14]. This is  useful in  understanding the insti-
tutional dynamics within the sector, but more needs to be done
to understand the role of wider institutional context[s] on com-
munity and municipal ownership forms [15,16].  What has been
missing is an investigation of the enabling institutions of civic and
civil participation beyond the energy sector, and their impact on
energy systems. This paper focusses on the interplay of financial
institutions and civic ownership structures.
2.2. Exploring a ‘civic’ framing
To  explore the effect of enabling institutions on the non-state
non-corporate ownership models in the energy sector, a  broad def-
inition is needed. We adopt the term ‘civic’ because civil society
and the civic sphere have often been proposed as a  third element
of contemporary society, beyond market and state. Civil society can
provide goods and services in a  way which claims to both transcend
the bureaucracy and ideologies of state forms of welfare and service
provision, and ameliorate the amorality of pure market approaches
[17,18]. However, whereas civil society refers to a community of
citizens linked by common interests and collective activity, ‘civic’
is defined as relating to a  city or town, especially its administration
(the municipal). Whereas civil society can be a-territorial, ‘civic’ has
a particular geography and incorporates the local state or  munici-
pality. Municipalities are often classified as part  of the public sector,
a ‘state’ form. However the unproblematic adoption of the munic-
ipal level as a pure ‘state’ form does not capture the agency of a
municipality beyond the strategies imposed upon it by higher lev-
els of the state [38].  Whilst we do not argue for an incorporation of
the municipal into civil society, we  do argue that the ‘civic’ fram-
ing is a useful moniker for investigating the interplay of values,
institutional form and energy system change.
2.3. Institutions as enabling agents
The financial institutions of a country are  often characterised
as either bank or market-based [19].  In national economies with
a more [neo]-liberal political economy as in the UK, ‘market
based’ finance is drawn from capital markets via  equity or debt
instruments traded in liquid securities. “In co-ordinated market
economies such as Germany and Japan, banks play a  much more
important role in the long-term financing of companies as part
of a broader ‘corporatist’ industrial structure” [20].  Following the
Varieties of Capitalism School, this national [financial] institutional
context affects the ability of economies to  deploy finance to  either
fixed capital formation and lending to the ‘real economy’ [20].
As decentralised energy systems are a  particularly visible form of
fixed capital formation, one would expect institutional analysis of
finance to form a  greater part of energy systems research. How-
ever much energy research on  financial ‘institutions’ focusses on
the micro-economic institutions of market making tools and sup-
port regimes such as renewable energy subsidies [21], emissions
trading mechanisms [22] and carbon pricing [23].  This has proven
a rich ground of analysis for neo-classical and political/institutional
economists alike. However, much less attention has been paid to
how the institutional context beyond the energy sector affects how
each of these mechanisms play out (though see [24,25]) particularly
at the local scale.
Sovacool [26] calls for more attention to energy institutions
and the governance forms they produce. There is  no uncontested
definition of an ‘institution’ due to  a  divergence between origi-
nal and neo-institutional economics [27]. We  begin with Foxon’s
[28] definition; institutions are ‘ways of structuring human inter-
actions’. Here institutions are “the rules of the game”, which
can include regulatory frameworks, property rights and standard
modes of business organisation. Neo-institutional approaches con-
ceive of formal and informal institutions placing constraints on
human behaviour. Formal institutions are codified rules, legisla-
tion etc enforced by courts; with informal institutions comprising
behavioural norms, enforced at the individual level through peer
groups etc. For an example of formal institutions in the energy
field see Aalto [29] who defines three types of formal institutions in
energy governance (regulations and rules, actor organisations, and
actor agents).
The ‘original’ institutional economics tradition views the for-
mal/informal distinction, and its framing of institutions as pure
constraints on human behaviour, as insufficient [30]. The  origi-
nal institutionalists, following Veblen [31],  understand the role
of institutions as enablers of specific action, and shapers of indi-
vidual preference. This approach pays more attention to  social
rules systems, and how  some institutions rely on others for legiti-
macy. Hall and Taylor [32] describe how the institutions of  a  given
nation or  region can lead to ‘path dependency’,—the idea that the
history of institutional development through space and time mat-
ters. For  an energy example, see Toke et al [62].  who analyse
the institutional factors beyond renewable energy price supports
and geographic resource that lead to different rates of deploy-
ment of wind energy across four nations. For  Provance et al. [33],
renewable energy deployments are affected by socio-institutional
forces such as cultural norms, values, and behaviours, which are
adopted by organisations to  constrain some behaviours but enable
others. Institutions then, include the codified rules of formal insti-
tutions, informal behavioural norms and the layering of institutions
through time  which can lead to path dependency and lock in
[28,34].  One must pay attention to formal institutions in  structur-
ing market interactions, and the social construction of institutions,
historic contingency, and the complex interplay of shared values
across institutional worlds. Much civil society activity relies on
some form of shared norms and values, which are critical pre-
conditions for community energy and institutional management
of other resources [2,35,36]: “As manifestations of shared values,
institutions influence agents’ preferences, choices, and actions as
well as aggregate economic and environmental outcomes” ([37] p.
360).
Original institutionalism opens the study of institutions to  a
wider political economy. Nation states, despite ongoing processes
of reorganization, have an enduring power to mould the institu-
tional environments of given sectors [30].  This raises the question
of not only how the state moulds institutional environments, but
also for whom. In defining the state as strategically selective, Jessop
[38] describes how in built biases of state structures make them
more accessible to some groups and interests than others. Original
institutional economists argue that a  nation’s territorial political
economy profoundly affects the spatial composition of financial
institutions, which in turn affects the likelihood of these institu-
tions to  lend into local/regional organisations in  the ‘real’ economy
[39,40].  As Mitchell [41] and Smith demonstrate; the political econ-
omy  of different nation states permeate into the institutions of
energy system transitions. As such there are  links between national
political economy, the geography and activity of financial institu-
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tions and energy systems change, which have not  received enough
attention from energy scholars.
2.4. The role of financial institutions in enabling energy system
change
The relation of civil society institutions to renewable energy
development is  well reported in  the Danish experience [43–45].
However these studies deal with institutional landscapes more
broadly, including finance as an important agent, but not centralis-
ing financial institutions as a unit of analysis. Recent contributions
have analysed the effects of territorial devolution on the insti-
tutional support for renewable energy in  the UK which find
the  institutional landscape in the UK systemically favours major
projects and large corporations [46,61], and cites a  lack of com-
patible financial institutions in  the banking sector, as a barrier
to civic energy in the UK [47,59] but little work has been done
to flesh out the relation to  the overall institutional structure of
UK banking and finance. In Germany there has been some more
explicit analysis of the role of financial institutions in  civic energy
[48,49]. Yildiz et al. [50] highlight claims that German co-operative
financing structures ‘provide the institutional framework to involve
citizens with political, social, and financial aspects of renewable
energy deployment’, but  focus their analysis on internal dynam-
ics of co-operatives. Whilst this work briefly acknowledges the
role of local and co-operative banks in  enabling the debt ele-
ment of citizen finance participation, they remain unanalysed
as a causal factor in growing citizen investment in renewable
energies. Yildiz [49] calls for an analysis of how institutional
backgrounds of these actors ‘not only give insight on how exist-
ing financial institutions and instruments complement the equity
raised by citizens, but also help to develop measures and a frame-
work to further promote investments of citizens in renewable
energy’.
Two research questions follow; what role does the macro insti-
tutional context of the finance and banking sector in each nation
play in enabling different technologies and organisational struc-
tures to proliferate? And to what degree are  civic energy futures
dependent on the way financial institutions respond to  strategic
actions of the state?
3. Methods: comparative case study of Germany and the UK
An international comparative study of the emerging civic energy
sectors in Germany and the UK was undertaken. Sovacool [26] calls
for comparative approaches when studying energy society interac-
tions as they can increase the robustness and applicability of case
results. Aalto [29] recognises the value of case oriented compara-
tive method in studying energy institutions. We select the UK and
Germany here, due to  four elements which suggest institutional
histories and path dependence will be particularly instructive.
Firstly, whilst both countries are committed to  low-carbon energy
futures, the macro framing of these transitions differs significantly.
In the UK, this is framed in  terms of state creation of ‘competitive’
markets: “the Government will create markets that  enable compet-
ing low carbon technologies to win the largest market share” [51];
in Germany, the ‘Energiewende’ transition is seen as involving a
wide range of actors in contributing to achieving an energy systems
change. Secondly, the different experiences of electricity market
liberalisation. Where the UK’s market liberalisation was imposed
on a nationalised and centralised electricity system, German mar-
ket liberalisation took place in the context of a  decentralised and
municipally-led post-war reconstruction [52].  Thirdly, the historic
centralisation of the UK state is in contrast to the decentralised
model of the German federal system. Finally, as we  study finan-
cial institutions, this comparison is important because the UK  and
Germany can be seen at opposite ends of a  spectrum of mar-
ket based (neoliberal) compared to bank based (co-ordination)
economies [40]. Both systems are  of a similar technical maturity,
ruling out any bias based on development phases. This approach
enabled investigation of the penetration of civic forms of energy
provision where they could reasonably be expected to  differ due in
part to variations in financial institutions.
This study utilised a qualitative research design consisting of
in-depth semi-structured interviews, and secondary documentary
analysis of policy and statistical publications. Interviewees were
selected that had interests in the finance, ownership, or gover-
nance of the energy systems in the UK and Germany, focussing on
the electricity sector. Primary data is drawn from in-depth inter-
views with 36 individuals from across the electricity value chain in
the UK and Germany. The interviewees comprised 7  utility exec-
utives (including two  stadtwerke executives), 9 energy finance
providers (from hedge funds and pensions funds to  citizen and co-
operative finance), 6 project developers, 5 institutional investment
professionals, 2 policy professionals, 2 energy journalists, 2 energy
lobbyists, 2 academics, and 1 municipal energy officer.
4. Results: civic sector involvement across the electricity
value chain in the UK and Germany
Drawing on this empirical evidence base, the levels of civic sec-
tor participation in the electricity value chain are presented for
the UK and Germany, and the effect of the institutions of  energy
policy/regulation and the structure of the financial institutions in
each nation are drawn together to demonstrate how these have
influenced these levels of civic sector participation.
4.1. The United Kingdom
In the UK, the starting point for a  low carbon energy transition
is the current liberalised energy system with highly concentrated
private ownership. Prior to  1945, European electricity systems
were predominantly the remit of local authorities or  civic groups
[53,52].  In the UK circa 300 of these organisations were involved
in electricity supply [54].  Wollman et al. [52] find the post-war
move to nationalised energy systems in France, Italy and the UK,
a  key moment in  the centralisation of the energy sector. Pond
describes the Conservative governments of 1979–1997 as leading
an unprecedented liberalisation of the UK energy system, which
benefitted from having a fully nationalised industry to  privatise.
4.1.1. Generation
Following UK market liberalisation, electricity generation assets
have been almost exclusively owned by corporate utilities [56–58].
In 2014, there were 32 Major Power Producers, accounting for 82.7%
of installed capacity [57].  Following a  series of mergers and entry
of a  small number of large international utilities, a  ‘Big Ten’ of
generation companies emerged, which includes the ‘Big Six’ ver-
tically integrated utilities, alongside ESB, Drax, GDF  Suez and AES.
In 2012 these ten companies collectively owned 85.8% of UK gen-
eration assets [58].  The remaining 14.2% comprises 64  medium
sized private companies and corporate entities. The ‘Big Six’  utili-
ties own  47% of renewable capacity [57]. Whilst renewable energies
have a  less concentrated ownership structure than thermal genera-
tion, beneficial ownership remains predominantly in private hands
(ibid). The community energy sector owns 0.3% of renewable capac-
ity; approximately 60MW [59].  Comparable municipal generation
statistics are unavailable but are unlikely to exceed 1% [9].
The formal institutional support system has been the Renew-
ables Obligation which has been criticised for being too complex,
characterising revenues too uncertain for civil society groups to
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substantively engage with [60,61]. Other institutional barriers to
civil society participation have been the planning system [18,62]
and infrastructure connection problems [63].  However some of
these problems can be seen as symptomatic of institutional bar-
riers in the financial system. Many objections in the planning
system have been linked to  a  lack of locally beneficial financial
and ownership models being offered by developers [64,65].  Sim-
ilarly, the complexity of the Renewables Obligation affects the ease
with which commercial banks can finance the sector [66],  this was
reflected by one of our German interviewees:
“I have taken a  look into the [UK] regulatory framework a few
years ago, the certificate system [RO], and as it’s totally different
from the German model, [Landsbank name] decided not to work
in this kind of system, because we are focusing on let’s say the
fixed feed-in tariffs, because it’s obviously easier to do  cash flow
calculation based on that.”
(RE Finance provider, GER, 2014)
Whilst larger schemes qualifying for the RO face financial com-
plexity, at the sub 5 MW scale, the UK Feed in Tariffs (FiTs) and
Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) for small scale schemes are sim-
pler, and have led to  a  number of innovative financing solutions
that bridge the gap between institutional capital and aggregated
small scale Schemes [67], some of this innovation adopts more
progressive models than others:
“there’s this group of people making a fortune from tax and
investment vehicles, where you’ve got a minimum investment
of 25 K  and they are the ones financing the free solar type
projects, they’re getting the FiTs off the back of it, its money
for nothing, it really is,  risk free, 10–11%. That opportunity is
not opened up in any way to  the mass market.  . ..Since 2008 the
richest 1% have doubled their wealth where everybody else’s
wealth has declined, if you see some of these investment oppor-
tunities that people with high sums to invest get access to it is
insane”
(Energy finance provider, UK 2013)
The same respondent added “what we don’t have is the small
medium sized capital markets” which were seen as necessary to
capitalise small to medium renewables schemes. Much of this inno-
vative financial practise is  due to a lack of compatible financial
institutions in the UK at the right level to capitalise smaller FiT
schemes [66].
4.1.2. Distribution
The privatisation of the UK energy system in the 1990s moved
transmission and distribution networks to a  regulated approach.
Following mergers, the 14 regional distribution networks are now
operated by seven corporate groups [68,69].  Distribution networks
form natural monopolies and in the UK and Germany, operate an
allowable revenues system, regulated by  specific formulae [70,71].
There has been interest expressed by UK municipalities in own-
ing distribution networks [72],  but ownership of distribution assets
outside private hands is still rare. There is  very little opportunity for
civic participation in distribution networks, largely because there
is no periodic opportunity to change ownership structure.
4.1.3. Supply
In the retail market, the UK is  dominated by  six suppliers with
95% of domestic and 80% of commercial supply [73]. Efforts to
promote more competition have led to 24 companies offering elec-
tricity and/or gas supply to households and 30 companies offering
electricity and/or gas supply to commercial consumers [74,75].
Whilst the market shares of the big  six are falling overall, concerns
remain over the outcomes being secured by households and SMEs.
There are signs of diversification, with new entrants including a
number of low-carbon energy suppliers, a co-operative supplier,
and a private supplier focussed on promoting community energy.
Whilst still unrealised, there is  significant interest in achieving
supply market penetration from civil society groups, including bur-
geoning interest in setting up  new municipal supply companies
[76].  Several formal institutional barriers to supply market penetra-
tion by civic actors have been identified [76],  including barriers to
supply market participation originating in  a lack of financial insti-
tutions able to offer the collateral needed to  enter the electricity
retail market:
“the size of the money that you need to have stashed away
somehow whether it’s cash or collateral or  parent company,
guaranteed or some big brother system beside you at the table
when you’re negotiating these contracts gets to  be a  jolly big
number [.  . .]  about £50m of wholesale energy. So in very crude
terms if you’ve 100,000 customers all renewing for a  year on
the same day you need to find somehow £50m of collateral to
secure a  price quoted on day one. And that is  a serious problem
for any energy supplier but it’s also clearly a key problem for
any municipal, well any community energy group. . .”
(Utility executive, 2015)
Currently there is  no ‘parent company’ or ‘big brother system’
with sufficient finance capital to support new market entrants.
Larger municipal authorities may  be able to source this collateral,
but there are no supportive institutional structures in the financial
sector to facilitate this.
4.1.4. The role of financial institutions
The UK is the archetype of market based, centralized and
spatially concentrated finance [39].  Following Verdier [40],  this
geographic and market concentration is likely to lead to  a fall in  ‘real
economy’ lending and affect fixed capital formation [77].  Whilst the
UK does indeed perform poorly on both measures [20,78].  these
data are too broad to  unpick how financial institutions capitalise
energy generally, and civic energy specifically.
Blyth et al [79] show that 50% of recent UK generation fleet
finance has come from debt or equity raised against the assets and
cash flows of corporate utilities. Yet the ability of traditional utilities
to  fund requisite levels of renewables deployment is  question-
able [79]. This foregrounds the issue of which financial institutions
the other 50% has come from, as this sector may  need to  expand
capital allocation to energy transitions. The form of these institu-
tions is  important, because it affects the types of renewable energy
preferred by investors, the energy business models they prefer to
invest in, and the financial vehicles they prefer to invest with [25];
the UK respondents described the non-utility element of capacity
investment:
“Pretty much all wind has been financed in  two ways: half has
come from the balance sheets of the utility companies and the
other half has come from banks, project finance from banks”
(Institutional Investment Professional, 2013)
In the UK, relying on utility balance sheet finance and project
finance from banks means relying on two centralised and inter-
nationalised sources of private capital. This has had two  effects
on UK energy investment. Firstly the availability of capital for the
UK energy sector is more exposed to  volatility in broader finan-
cial markets, as utility equity and bank debt in market based
systems is closely tied to capital liquidity more generally [20].  Sec-
ondly the ability of multinational and investment capital to lend to
small/medium scale projects is very low, largely due to the liquidity
requirements of market based financial systems [25].  Commercial
banks and utilities were very exposed to capital market volatil-
ity during the financial crisis, reducing the capital available for
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energy system investment [79]. As such, recent UK energy policy
(the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) package) has been designed
to expand the types of financial institutions investing in renew-
ables by attracting the ‘mainstream’ investment community [80],
i.e. pension, sovereign wealth, insurance and hedge/private wealth
funds:
“The main way we have to  finance the transition is  going to  be
through project finance, but the banks who currently do manage
project finance aren’t going to  be able to do  it,  so the mainstream
investment community is  going to be looked to”
(Institutional Investment professional, 2013 [our emphasis])
The Electricity Market Reform (EMR) package was specifically
designed to attract investment from pension fund, insurance fund
and sovereign wealth funds by  adopting a  FiT system with contracts
for difference (CfDs) to secure a more stable and predictable rev-
enue stream, thought to  be attractive to these financial institutions:
“. . .in principle the idea, what EMR  could produce is fundamen-
tally something that could  be quite attractive to the UK defined
benefit pension plans if  structured in  the right way”
(RE Investor, 2013)
However, utility balance sheet finance, project finance from
international banks, and mainstream investment finance is  unlikely
to capitalise myriad citizen, municipal and co-operative distributed
renewable energy schemes of £20m and below:
“. . .there’s not  many banks out there that will loan on small
scale community schemes. You can only talk to the big  banks if
you’re borrowing millions of pounds, that’s when they’re really
interested in you.”
(Co-operative energy developer UK, 2013)
In the UK it has been difficult for civil society energy schemes to
source appropriate levels of finance; an issue explicitly recognised
in the UK Government’s community energy strategy as a  ‘finance
gap’ for projects where ‘city’ level project finance does not  usually
start below £20m [59]. This could have been partially addressed
by the UK’s Green Investment Bank, capitalised with £3.8bn public
funds. But the GIB has lent £2bn to date to  predominantly indepen-
dent private power provision or larger public sector projects [81].
There are movements toward a  smaller scale citizen finance sec-
tor in the UK. Companies such as Abundance and Pure Leapfrog are
offering citizen finance debentures for small scale investors. The
County of Hampshire is in  the process of establishing a  commu-
nity bank tasked with delivering a  low carbon economy, explicitly
citing the German banking model as key to  supporting renewable
energies [82].  For now however the finance gap remains real for
the smaller scale energy schemes preferred by civil society groups.
In summary, the distribution and retail elements of the UKs elec-
tricity system incorporates little or no elements of civic ownership.
Where new financial vehicles have been created by the state, they
have been in the form of a CfD FiT vehicle structured for the pref-
erences of large investment institutions, or as in the case of small
scale FiTs have been beneficial to  investors with significant deploy-
able funds (see [67]). In  generation, the institutional constraints of
planning law, connection charges and a  complex subsidy system
are widely recognised. This research adds to this with an under-
standing that the institutions of a market based financial system
find it very difficult to  capitalise small scale renewables, and so
civil society ownership and civic participation in energy generation
is likely to remain niche without changes to the system of financial
institutions.
4.2. Germany
In  Germany, the ‘Energiewende’ transition begins from a
more decentralised ownership base. In  West Germany in  partic-
ular, there was  no nationalisation of the electricity system and
post-war reconstruction retained existing principals of local self-
government, remaining largely under municipal ownership. The
‘stadtwerke’ (municipally owned utilities) provided the majority of
energy services. European market reforms struggled in the German
energy sector, which remained [largely] under municipal control
until European directives, specifically 96/92/EC [83],  forced monop-
olies to  break by introducing the right to switch supplier and
requiring the unbundling of generation, supply and transmission
[84].  This led  to a  wave of mergers resulting in  a  ‘big four’ emerg-
ing from the previous eight vertically integrated energy companies
[85].  This posed a challenge to  the Stadtwerke which had oper-
ated local or regional integrated monopolies; though many saw this
as an opportunity to  invite private capital into their shareholder
structure or  divest themselves of energy obligations.
Market liberalisation saw a  reduction in Stadtwerke from circa
900–600 [52].  However, there has been a  return to municipal
and community ownership of energy infrastructures, referred to
as re-communalisation [86].  This refers to the re-establishment
of stadtwerke but also incorporates other civic ownership struc-
tures, such as co-operatives. The number of Stadtwerke active in
energy has risen to  approximately 850 [87].  By 2012, 170 com-
munities had won back distribution grid concession contracts, 60
new stadtwerke had been formed [86] and the post-liberalisation
dilution of municipal equity in  stadtwerke is being reversed [52].
4.2.1. Generation
Installed capacity in 2014 was  196,133 GW and comprised 707
individual power producing companies [88]. There is  a lower con-
centration of ownership in thermal generation with the ‘Big Four’
(E.ON, EnBW, RWE  and Vattenfall) owning 33.4% of total generation
capacity (ibid). Stadtwerke own  6% of total installed capacity [89],
where part or all of the beneficial ownership rests with municipal-
ities. 33% of installed capacity is made up  of <10 MW  installations
supported by the German Feed in  Tariff (EEG) with a  diverse own-
ership structure which is  expanded on below. The remaining 28%
comprises hundreds of companies with individual installations,
larger corporations with multiple sites and co-operative and citizen
wind parks (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. German installed capacity by  ownership 2014.
(Source: Bundesnetzagentur, 2014 [88])
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Fig. 2. Ownership of installed RE capacity in Germany (2012).
(Source: German Renewable Energies Agency, 2013 [90])
Whilst conventional generation in  Germany incorporates signif-
icant elements of municipal, citizen, co-operative and community
ownership, it is  the ownership structures of installed renewable
capacity that vary most markedly from the UK. Ownership of
renewable generation assets is  diverse and incorporates multiple
non-corporate, non-state models (Fig. 2).
Industry, Germany’s ‘Big Four’, project firms, other power
providers and investment funds/banks account for only 53% of
renewable capacity ownership. The Stadtwerke are classed as
‘other power producers’. The category “Investment funds and
banks” is heterogeneous and contains institutional investors such
as pensions and insurance funds as in  the UK, closed end funds
structured by specialised issuing houses and funds drawing on high
net worth Individuals. Part of this segment is within this defini-
tion of ‘civic’ energy via the civic institutions of finance defined in
Section 4.2.4.
For the 35% of renewables under ‘private individuals’ this con-
stitutes structures through which energy co-operatives, private
householders and communities develop renewable generation.
DGRV estimate that more than 800 new energy cooperatives have
invested circa 1.3 billion euros in renewable energy projects [90].
The co-operative share has increased to  constitute 21% of the 34GW
installed capacity under citizen ownership [53].
An important driver of this civic ownership of renewable gener-
ation is the creation and retention of value within local economies:
“We’re really democratising the energy system by allowing
everyone in Germany the opportunity, or giving everyone the
opportunity to participate in  the system. And that’s something
that has put the Energiewende at the heart of political priori-
ties.”
(Energy Journalist, 2014)
“So you can feel this entrepreneurship and this regional commu-
nity thing in this kind of business. It is  very impressive that there
is millions and millions in investments in the region from the
money of the people into regional projects using regional crafts-
men etc. I think this is the key story of energy co-operatives in
Germany. It’s more about regional development.”
(Co-operative Banking Group Executive, 2014)
These notions of democratisation, local value retention and
regional development as motivators for civic participation in
energy transitions are present in  the UK [76] but there was a  sub-
stantially deeper appreciation of renewable energies as constitutive
of citizen empowerment and regional economic development
amongst our German respondents.
Numerous studies highlight the role of the German feed in tariff
system or EEG law as particularly supportive of civic participation
in energy [91,92]. It is  clear that the formal institutional structure
of the EEG was  a  catalyst for renewables development in  Germany.
How this was enabled by German financial institutions is the focus
of Section 4.2.4.
4.2.2. Distribution
According to  the VKU (association of municipal utilities),
around 60% of distribution concessions in Germany remain with
stadtwerke [94].  Co-operative ownership of distribution infrastruc-
ture does exist through, though new energy co-ops are  less engaged
in  distribution grid activity [95]. Whilst some re-communalised
concessions are small, there have been large re-municipalisations.
A significant example is Hamburg, where in September 2013,
50.9% voted in favour of re-municipalisation and the city has
agreed purchased the grid from Vattenfall for between 495
and 550 million Euros [95].  There are several reasons cited
for re-municipalisation/communalisation trend. Respondents con-
sistently identified acceleration of renewable penetration and
retention of energy value as key drivers:
“..The clear goal is  to  accelerate the energy transition and the
ways to operate the grid in  terms of supporting the change to
renewable energies [.  . .]  another motivation is this empower-
ment idea yes, this is  something I have observed in many citizen
driven energy co-ops, the do it yourself philosophy. We can do
it on our own.”
(Source: Co-operative energy developer, 2014)
Several respondents questioned how the acceleration of grid
investment to integrate renewables could be achieved through
re-communalisation, given that municipal/citizen grid operators
are subject to  the same allowable revenues structure as private
grid operators. Some recent studies show the values accruing to
municipalities from grid investments include, but are not limited
to:  increased tax bases, employment opportunities, and energy
security [97,98,72].  These studies support the case for grid infras-
tructure to  be cross subsidised from revenues outside the regulated
charge structure. Further, municipalities recognising the benefits of
high-quality grid infrastructure within their own territory, are pre-
pared to accept a lower return on the asset base, and stipulate that
retained revenues be re-invested in grid services:
“The main effect [of being municipally owned] is  we  are not
talking every quarter, every year about results and profits. The
communes [municipalities] are  long term oriented, because
they are very much interested in  a  very good and safe reliant
infrastructure.”
(Stadtwerke executive, 2014)
The re-municipalisation of grid infrastructure is  not wholly
unproblematic. Capital cannot be raised through equity issue with-
out diluting municipal control [98].  Also, where municipalities or
co-operatives wish to develop generation capacity, grid infrastruc-
ture has to compete for discretionary capital expenditure [99].
In Germany there is  a heterogeneous ownership structure
for electricity distribution assets which is  tending towards re-
communalisation. Proponents believe this will accelerate the
energy transition and retain values from energy infrastructures
locally.
4.2.3. Supply
The German electricity supply market comprises over 1000
companies [101].  This includes approximately 850 stadtwerke
that often only supply customers within their territorial footprint,
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though larger stadtwerke will supply business customers beyond
their territory. 60–70 Co-operative utilities were reported as active
in energy supply by  two interviewees, but this is unconfirmed. An
average German household is  able to choose between 80 electricity
suppliers [101].  Estimates of municipal supply market share range
between 31% [101] and 46% [102].  The domestic market share of the
Big Four reported by BDEW (2012) was 43.8%, which has declined
in recent years but only from a high of circa 50% [99].
A supplier landscape with a  high degree of municipal involve-
ment in the form of Stadtwerke changes the use to which profits
from electricity supply are put. The VKU state that their members:
“. . .do not primarily pursue private commercial objectives but
are guided by public welfare obligations. In our democratic
system, they operate under local self-administration to  serve
“citizen value”, i.e. to  meet the needs of the local community.
The  type of capital they form and secure is  a  community-
oriented asset.”
(Resolution of the VKU Executive Committee of 26 February
2008, available at [104])
Whereas almost 100% of the dividends from UK electricity sup-
ply companies are distributed via international capital markets, the
profits from stadtwerke, which comprise between a  third and a
half of the electricity supply market, can be used for a  number
of social, environmental and economic development goals which
may  or may  not be energy related. To take an example from a  large
entity, Stadtwerke Köln returned circa 265 Million Euro to  the city
in 2011, most of which was derived from energy services [105].
Respondents identified the advantages of being a municipal utility
rather than a  corporate utility:
“It is the possibility to make earnings. Before, 100 years ago it
was to cover the needs of inhabitants and now it’s  about the
local economy”
(Stadtwerke executive, 2014)
“[City name] was one of the first cities in the beginning of the
90s that set up  a local climate protection concept in 2006–2007
this was a  programmes with measures. This was  decided by the
city council, in 2008 there was a  climate alliance with the city
and the Stadtwerke”
(Stadtwerke executive, 2014)
Yet Stadtwerke are diverse organisations. Respondents
described a spectrum of those that were supportive of citizen
energy to those which were ambivalent or hostile due to the
effect of citizen energy on their business models. These results
do not describe municipal energy companies as universally
positive, unproblematic entities, nor is  municipal ownership a
pre-determinant of energy transition. It  was however clear that
their ability to appropriate value from energy supply, means that,
depending on the decisions of municipal actors, a  proportion of
energy value can be locally retained and recycled into decarboni-
sation and energy transition, the fiscal stability of the local state,
and/or cross subsidise other local services.
4.2.4. The role of financial institutions
The expansion of citizen, municipal and co-operative stakes in
the German energy sector has been enabled by financial institu-
tions that incorporate three traits unfamiliar in the UK’s centralised
sector: local subsidiarity, common public benefit values and pro-
motional lending. There is an established local banking sector in
Germany, in which the scales of loans are more compatible with
distributed energy schemes. The two main institutions in this sec-
tor are the Savings Banks Group (Sparkassen and Landesbank)
and the co-operative banks (Volks and Raiffeisen Banks). The sav-
ings banks and co-operative banks are not small players—in 2014,
they comprised 62% of all small business loans, almost 100% of
loans to  tradespeople, 50% of consumer credit, 42% of  loans to
municipalities and 60% of mortgages [106]. However, each regional
bank is a separate business under the institutional form of a  sav-
ings/mutual bank. Where the UK has 162 banks, Germany has over
1600 [107]; though much like the stadtwerke, not all customers
can access all savings/co-operative banks, as they are territorially
bound:
“The difference between a savings bank and other lenders is that
the savings bank will not withdraw [.  . .]  it is  anchored within
that local area and also bound to only operate in  that local area,
will have to live off the profits that it can make in that local
area. [. . .]  So each and every savings bank can adapt its actual
business to the condition it finds in  the local area; and that  is
very important. That is this decentralised model.”
(Savings Bank Executive, 2014)
“.  . .the local co-operative banks, they are rooted or  backed in
the regions [. . .]  In Germany we have a  little bit less than 1100
Volksbank and Raiffeisen banks [.  . .]  we don’t want to have such
big  units that we are not near  enough to the customers and
therefore we  are still quite a lot of Volksbank and Raiffeisenbank
so  that they are anchored in the regions on a  local level.”
(Co-operative Bank Group Employee, 2014)
This decentralised model has been proposed as an additional
financial institution for the UK, which would better support
household and SME  lending [108]. The territoriality principal and
proximity to customers and business was  cited several times by
interviewees as an enabler, building local knowledge and capacity
for small scale renewables investment. The following shows the
much wider participation a  savings bank can have in  driving the
decentralised energy economy:
“.  . ..  Sparkasse Heidelberg has started ten years ago when they
first issues a  loan for renewable energy in  households and today
they have a very large market share in that in their area but
also a  very high number of installations operating solar energy.
And they had to invest of course, they had to invest in  skills, in
technicalities, they set up a centre of competence and now it
works and this is  profitable both for the people who took the
loans and also for the savings bank”
Savings Bank Group Employee, 2014 [emphasis added]
Whilst there is  no special relationship to stadtwerke, as the
majority lender to German public authorities, the savings bank
group is  closely invested in municipal as well as citizen energy
schemes (see [109] p. 30–31; and [110]). For the co-operative banks,
the natural channel for energy related investment is  through both
direct investment and debt provision to  support the equity stakes
of circa 800 energy co-operatives:
“So there’s a  close relation between the co-operative banks and
energy co-operatives on the regional or local level. So  a  lot of
new renewable energy co-operatives were founded or were
supported by co-operative banks. So they supported business
plans so they built the right stuff”
(Co-operative Bank Group Employee, [emphasis added] 2014)
Both the savings and co-operative bank groups are key institu-
tional promoters and supporters of civil ownership of energy assets,
and they are not passive institutions. They provide developmen-
tal support to civic energy expansion as well as capital. The aims
and objectives of this local banking sector are compatible with the
notions of subsidiarity/self-government, economic stability, envi-
ronmental protection and social welfare expressed by actors across
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the value chain in Germany’s civic energy sector. Because of this,
both of the local banking institutions of Germany actively promote
local ownership and control of the energy sector:
“politically we have a  very clear opinion about what we call
re-communalisation. So also in  Germany not  all the energy sup-
pliers are in municipal hands, there is  a  strong tendency to
switch that and we support that switch. How do  we do that?
First of all we are advocating all kinds of decentralised energy
supply [. . .] this is  really something where civil society, where
communities where municipalities where people from outside
the authorities get together and try to  create something and try
to be independent and take some responsibility for their lives
and that is something that is  very close to the founding mission
of the savings banks. . .”
(Savings Bank Group Employee, 2014)
Energy co-operatives are local companies, they pay tax to  local
authorities. That’s different to a  national or international project
developer who runs a wind farm here in Brandenburg close to
villages and nobody is involved. So the benefits of these projects
remain in the region and that is  very important. That’s why a lot
of co-operatives banks support the foundation of these energy
co-operatives.”
(Co-operative Banking Group Employee, 2014)
A key enabler of the growth of this local energy finance is the
existence of refinancing loans from the German public develop-
ment bank KfW. KfW utilises its strong credit rating to source
capital market finance and offers refinancing options for renew-
able energy and energy efficiency loans. Between 2009 and 2013
the savings banks and co-operative banking group accounted for
circa 74% of the D  16.2bn distributed through KfW promotional
energy lending (Interviewee, 2014) a  great majority of this finance
is for loans under D 25m [111].  This is  clearly having substantive
systemic effects, as can be seen by the more than 33% of German
electrical capacity being accounted for by <10 MW capacity (Fig. 1).
Between customer deposits and KfW finance, a strong institutional
framework for risk shared investment in civic energy is  maintained.
In Germany, a  dense network of locally rooted banking insti-
tutions is able to offer strategic support and renewable energy
loans on favourable terms to  small, medium and (utilising regional
partners) sometimes large renewable energy schemes. They do  so
because renewable energy in  Germany is seen as a  sound invest-
ment that is compatible with their respective founding principles,
investment priorities and governing values.
5. The civic energy sector and enabling institutions
Whilst there have been several investigations into specific ele-
ments of the community, municipal, co-operative, and citizen
financed energy sectors in  both the UK and Germany, this research
provides a novel investigation of the effects of national financial
institutions on the proliferation of civic energy. The findings dis-
cussed above demonstrate the importance of understanding how
financial institutions enable civic energy participation, alongside
examining how regulatory institutions such as feed in tariff laws
and portfolio standards constrain or enable particular actors and
ownership forms.
In the UK case, the three main support mechanisms for renew-
able energy have been capitalised by financial forms created by the
incumbent, market based institutional system. The complexity of
the Renewables Obligation makes participation from non-specialist
market entrants difficult, both for civic actors and financial institu-
tions more used to  working with fixed FiT structures. The move to
FiT  auctions under EMR was an explicit move to bring in large main-
stream investment capital. One might argue this demonstrated a
strategic selectivity by the state (Jessop [38]) that openly favoured
existing financial interests. However, it may  be more accurate to
characterise this as a  reaction to  institutional path dependence
rather than the interests of capital, in that devoid of bank and utility
capitalisation of renewables, and in  a  market based financial sys-
tem, the only viable alternative in the short term was to seek capital
from actors on financial markets. Whist this further structurally dis-
advantages civic energy actors, it is more to do with institutional
path dependence in  the financial system, than an outright result of
financial sector lobbying or incumbent influence. In parallel, even
the small scale FiT, which is more closely related to the German EEG
law [66], and should be more amenable to civic participation, has
largely been captured by financial institutions beyond civil soci-
ety. The ‘finance gap’ identified in  the UK remains real, due to a  set
of institutional conditions that are outside the traditional purview
of energy policy. This landscape of market based financial insti-
tutions is structurally unsuited to  allocating capital to small scale
renewables. As  such it is difficult to see where expanded civic par-
ticipation is going to come from without extending the reach of
energy and other infrastructural policy into the UK institutions of
finance.
What is important in the German case is  the integration between
the bank based financial institutions of the German economy and
the civic energy sector. Statutes on public benefit lending enshrined
in savings bank governance and strong shared value frameworks
in the co-operative banking sector meant the EEG law was  intro-
duced into a  fertile environment for civic energy participation. This
research identified a commitment to regional economic stability
and self-governance as important shared values across the civic
energy sector.
The German state’s decision to  allow KfW promotional lend-
ing  to act as capital refinancing through the institutions of  savings
and co-operative banks is a  different example of state selectiv-
ity of financial institutions in  the energy space. This meant that
a dense network of smaller scale institutions allocate capital to
small and medium scale energy schemes through an established
framework of citizen investment and mutual ownership models.
In contrast, the UK’s green investment bank, the only analogous
financial institution, has lent almost exclusively to utility scale
generation through corporate actors. Whilst this research has char-
acterised the UK’s civic energy sector as niche, there is  evidence
of a revitalisation of civic energy participation led by  UK munic-
ipal authorities [112,113].  This is important because the growth
of institutions with compatible values can manifestly be mutually
supportive, and bring new business models and institutional forms
into the energy sector.
6. Conclusions
This paper has investigated the impact of civil society insti-
tutions on the energy sector in  the UK and Germany, and their
potential role in the energy system transitions underway in  these
countries. Both energy systems co-evolved with the institutions
of finance capital active in their respective nations. Where the
UK was  found to have a  latent but growing civic energy sector,
Germany shows a  strong sector with established institutional links
based on shared value frameworks. The civic energy sector in
Germany incorporates municipal institutions, co-operatives, and
citizen investment and re-communalisation groups. These actors
are not always harmonious, yet they do  form a substantive part of
the energy system that are subject to different dynamics than state
or corporate institutions.
Clearly these are broad characterisations and mask some impor-
tant conflicts and nuances within a complex environment both
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in  Germany and the UK. Civic actors and compatible financial
institutions exist in the UK (though in specific niches) and commer-
cial bank lending and insurance fund participation are  established
features of the German renewables market. Equally, whilst the
involvement of private equity in  stadtwerke has fluctuated, munic-
ipals and Lander often have significant holdings in private utilities.
However, this research has clearly identified the importance of the
macro-economic context of financial institutions for the emergence
of local energy ownership structures, with financial institutions
as active enablers in  energy transitions, which shape the owner-
ship structures and technology choices of the energy transitions of
different nations.
This research has implications for the realisation of a  low carbon
energy transition in these and other countries. The UK and Germany
lie towards opposite ends of the spectrum of liberalised market to
co-ordination economies, and their market-based vs bank-based
financial institutions reflect this. The forms of low carbon transition
currently being pursued reflect this institutional path dependence,
with the UK government framing the transition in  terms of state
creation of ‘competitive markets’, compared to  a  more inclusive
‘Energiewende’ in Germany. This suggests that, if the UK and other
market based economies want to encourage the development of a
civic energy sector, they would need to do  more to develop appro-
priate financial institutions, such as more locally oriented banks, to
support this. This is important in terms of realising the potential of
the civic energy sector to contribute to a transition in these coun-
tries, and also in  terms of the extent to  which benefits from these
investments are able to be retained within these localities.
There is a clear need for further analysis of financial institu-
tions as important enablers in  energy transitions. Further research
would benefit from focussed quantitative analysis of the volumes
and types of lending to civic energy groups. Further analysis of how
market based vs bank based economies capitalise energy transi-
tions would shed light on the links between energy policies and
national varieties of capitalism. Finally, an investigation of the final
costs different financial institutional landscapes impose on energy
transitions would demonstrate which forms of sector capitalisation
can achieve energy transitions both within credible cost frame-
works and with the requisite public support.
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